Volume 17

Issue 5

Article 5

1972

Recent Developments
Various Editors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Various Editors, Recent Developments, 17 Vill. L. Rev. 962 (1972).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss5/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Editors: Recent Developments

MAY

1972]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE TERLOCUTORY

DEATH KNELL DOCTRINE

TION DISMISSED NOTWITHSTANDING
CANT

REJECTED

-

IN-

APPEAL OF ORDER DENYING CLASS ACTION DESIGNANAMED

PLAINTIFF'S INSIGNIFI-

PERSONAL CLAIM.

Hackett v. General Host Corp. (3d Cir. 1972)
Plaintiff, a consumer of retail bread, initiated a class action' in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
1. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the initiation of a
class action if the class satisfies certain prerequisites: (1) the class must be so large
that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there must be questions of law or
fact common to all members of the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
The courts have differed substantially with respect to the number of litigants
that are necessary for a case to qualify as a class action. See Citizens Banking Co. v.
Monticello State Bank, 143 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1944) (40 persons sufficient). But see
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959) (20 persons insufficient).
As to the rule 23(a) requirement of adequate representation, one representative may be sufficient to adequately represent the class, but legal counsel must be
qualified to conduct the litigation. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.
1968). See Leete, The Right of Consumers to Bring Class Actions in the Federal
Courts - An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 39, 52-53 (1971).
In addition to fulfilling all rule 23(a) requirements, one of the three conditions
in rule 23(b) must be satisfied:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests ; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
Pursuant to rule 23(c) (1), the court must determine as early as possible
whether the action should be treated as a class suit, although the determination is
revocable. Under rule 2 3(c) (2), the court must determine the best practical notice
to be given members constituting the class in a rule 23(b) (3) action. In a rule
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under section 4 of the Clayton Act' against seven bakers of pan-baked
3
bread for alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Although her individual claim was for approximately only nine dollars,
Mrs. Hackett's complaint sought recovery for injury to herself and to all
other members of the class she claimed to represent, consisting of 1,500,000
individual purchasers of pan-baked bread in the Philadelphia market area.
The district court dismissed the class action allegations from her complaint
pursuant to rule 23(c) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on
the grounds that the proposed class was so large that its management
would have been impractical. Moreover, the district court denied plaintiff's
request to issue a certification under section 1292(b) 4 of the Judicial Code,
thus prompting Mrs. Hackett to file a notice of appeal contending that the
district court order denying the class action was a final appealable order
within the meaning of section 12911 of the Judicial Code.6 The United
23(b) (1) or rule 23(b) (2) action, the court must make a determination of the
specific membership in the class to establish the recipients of notice in the action.
See Leete, supra, at 53-55.
One of the most important features of rule 23 is that the judgment is
binding upon all members of a rule 23(b)(3) class, whether they appear in the
action or not, unless they affirmatively "opt out" of the litigation at its inception.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B). See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Perhaps the most important requirement of
rule 23(b)(3) is that the class action device must be superior to other methods
available for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. In this regard,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has instructed, in a Securities Exchange
Commission rule 10-b(5) context, that the relevant criterion for deciding whether a
class action is superior to other procedures is the number of persons injured by the
alleged violation. Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir.
1968).
In order to bring a class action in federal court, there must be necessarily
a jurisdictional basis. Therefore, the suit generally must present a federal question
or involve diversity of citizenship. The requisite diversity in a class action is
diversity only between the parties of record and not between all members of the
class and the class opponent. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356
(1921). However, generally there is the additional requirement that the amount in
controversy must exceed $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970),.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). This section provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
3. Generally, the Sherman Act declares illegal such combinations or conspiracies
as restrain or monopolize trade. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to
be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the
entry of the order ....
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). Section 1291 provides that "[t]he courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
6. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 620 (3d Cir.), review denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. June 20, 1972).
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding
that the small size of the named plaintiff's personal claim was not determinative of whether a district court's order denying a class action was
final within the meaning of section 1291, thus rejecting the "death knell"
rule of the Second Circuit. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618
(3d Cir.), review denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. June 20, 1972).
In order to understand the purpose of the death knell rule and to
comprehend the rationale behind and the possible impact of the instant
decision, it is first advisable to undertake a brief analysis of the historical
development of the final judgment rule. The rule was first established by
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and, since that time, has served as a procedural
control in the federal courts, prohibiting appeals from non-final interlocutory orders. 7 The concept of finality embraced by the final judgment rule
contemplates a complete disposition of the subject matter of the action
and of the rights of all the parties, thus resulting in a termination of the
litigation. Absent a determination of the merits, there is not sufficient
finality to warrant an appeal.8 The present statutory form of the final
judgment rule, embodied in section 1291 of the Judicial Code, 9 was intended to maintain the appellate case load at a manageable level by preventing the courts of appeals from being overwhelmed by piecemeal
appeals. 10 Other reasons supporting the final judgment rule include: the
inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review;11 the possible absence of
irreparable harm to the party appealing an interlocutory order ;12 and the
3
potential harassment of litigants by nuisance appeals.1
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938, the federal courts were not seriously overburdened by piecemeal
appeals, due to the application of the "single unit judgment theory," which
7. Note, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 133, 134 (1971). See Note, Interlocutory Appeal
From Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 1292 (1970).
8. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). See Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970). See note 5 supra.
10. Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. E. Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966)
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1956); Petrol Corp. v.
Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 162 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1947).
A recent study indicates that between 1969 and 1970 the federal courts of
appeals have experienced a 14 per cent increase in the number of appeals filed and
almost a 200 per cent increase over the number of appeals filed in 1960. Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1305 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971). Furthermore, the disposition
of cases by the appellate courts has increased by 129 per cent from 1960 to 1970.
Id. During the same decade, however, the number of circuit judgeships increased
by only 43 per cent. Id.
However, one commentator has asserted that, if the Fifth Circuit's experience
is an accurate indication, the number of section 1292(b) applications that are received
by the court, in relation to the total number of cases reviewed by the court, is
trivial. Note, Statutory Criteria for Review in the Federal Courts: the Proper
Indicia of Appealability?, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 371 (1967).
11. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964).
12. City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 299
(2d Cir. 1969).
13. American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277,
280 (2d Cir. 1967).
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"regarded an action as a single judicial unit which had to be adjudicated
in its entirety" before a circuit court would have jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. 14 However, in 1848, the Supreme Court deviated from this
general rule by holding that a partial adjudication of the merits was
appealable when a party would have suffered irreparable injury if appellate
review of that order was delayed until the final adjudication of the entire
case by the district court.',
After adoption of the Federal Rules, additional flexibility was introduced into the final judgment rule in an endeavor to facilitate appeal
where a meaningful appeal would be lost if immediate review were not
allowed, or where harmful consequences would result from an unnecessary
denial of review. 6 Among the statutory modifications of the final judgment rule was rule 54(b) which somewhat relaxed the single unit judgment theory.' 7 This rule consists of a certification procedure confined
exclusively to multiple-claims or multiple-parties litigations. The rule
permits the district judge in his discretion to grant "final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment."' 8 Additionally, section
1292(b) of the Judicial Code'0 was enacted in 1958 in order to allow
appeal, at the discretion of the trial and appellate courts, from interlocutory
orders which involve "a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation ....
-20 A further statutory modification of the strict final
judgment rule is section 1292(a) (1)21 which was promulgated to permit
immediate appeals from interlocutory orders granting, denying, or otherwise modifying injunctive relief. However, as with other interlocutory
orders, the injunction must determine rights and liabilities of the parties
14. Comment, The Appealability of Orders Under Supreme Court Rule 304, 3
JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & P. 84, 85

(1969). The principal jurisdictional considera-

tion for an appeal is whether the appeal should be processed at the present time or

at some later, more appropriate time. The appellate jurisdictional question may be
raised by the parties, sua sponte by the court, and even on subsequent review by the
Supreme Court. Note, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 133, 134 n.4 (1971).
15. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 212 (1848). The Court held that a
circuit court decree, which ordered the transfer of title to the disputed property
to an assignee in bankruptcy but which remanded the action for an accounting, was
a final decree and therefore appealable. Id.
16. Note, supra note 10, at 366.
17. Comment, supra note 14, at 86.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
20. Id. See note 4 supra.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1970). This section provides:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . or of the judges
thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,
or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court ....
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in order to be appealable under the statute.2 2 This section gives
the court of
23
appeals jurisdiction without certification by the trial court.
Independent of the statutory modifications, federal case law has expanded the final judgment rule via two basic approaches. Firstly, in
Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp.,24 decided in 1949, the Supreme
Court introduced the so-called "collateral order doctrine." 25 The essence
of the doctrine is threefold: first, the rights determined by the order
must be collateral to the merits of the action; second, the order must be
ripe for review; and third, the rights in question must be sufficiently
important to the further development of the case to warrant appeal. 26 The
Cohen Court held that a district court's interlocutory order denying the
application of a state statute, which required the plaintiffs to post security
for the defendant's reasonable attorney's fees, was a final order for purposes
of section 1291. In support of the holding, the Court reasoned that the
order finally determined important rights, although collateral to the merits
of the action, which rights would be irreparably lost if appeal was delayed
27
pending a final judgment on the merits.
The second approach was announced by the Supreme Court the
following year in Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.28 in which
the Court established a rule permitting appeal from interlocutory orders
concerning the merits, as opposed to those concerning a collateral issue.
In concluding that the order was final for purposes of appeal, the Court
employed a balancing test in which the most important competing considerations were "the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the
one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other." 29 In
a subsequent case, Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,30 the Supreme
Court, in adjudicating the finality of an order partially determining the
merits, reaffirmed the Dickinson balancing test and specifically reiterated
the language in Cohen that the requirement of finality was to be given a
31
practical rather than a technical construction.
In 1966 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin 2 without relying on either section 1292(b) or rule
54(b), recognized a right of appeal from an order striking the class action
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

NAACP v. Thompson, 321 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1963).
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970).
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
Id. at 546.
455 F.2d at 627 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
337 U.S. at 546-47.
338 U.S. 507 (1950).
Id. at 511.
379 U.S. 148 (1964).
Id. at 152-53.
370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
Plaintiff brought a class action in the district court alleging that the defendants, two major "odd-lot" dealers on the New York Stock Exchange, had conspired to monopolize odd-lot trading and had charged excessive fees, in violation
of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2). Id. at 119-20.
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allegations of a complaint. 33 The Eisen court combined the reasoning of
Cohen and Dickinson by applying the Dickinson balancing test to a matter
collateral to the merits of the case. To support its holding of finality, the
court articulated the "death knell rule" - an order denying a class action
designation will be considered final within the meaning of section 1291
where the named plaintiff's individual claim alone is so small that no lawyer
of competence would undertake such a complex case to recover such a
paltry amount.34 Implicit in the death knell rule was the rationale,
expressed in Gillespie, that finality was to be given a practical rather than
a technical construction.

3 5

In two subsequent cases, the Second Circuit dismissed appeals from
orders denying class actions on the ground that the Eisen rule was inapplicable where the individual claims of the named plaintiffs seeking to
represent the class were $150,00036 and $1,560,000.

37

More recently, the

38

Second Circuit, in Korn v. Franchard Corp., considered appeals from
orders denying class action designations in two separate cases and held
that the appeal of the named plaintiff whose individual claim totaled $386
was within the Eisen rule, but dismissed the appeal of the other named
plaintiff whose individual claim was for $8,500."9 As it presently exists
in the Second Circuit, the death knell doctrine expressed in Eisen appears
to have been corrupted by arbitrary judicial fiat to the point where orders
denying class action allegations will only be held final where the named
plaintiff's individual claim is less than $8,500. Above that figure, it is
assumed that a lawyer would accept the case.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was
confronted with a factual situation similar to that presented the Second
Circuit in Eisen. In both cases the named plaintiffs in class actions had
insignificant individual claims and were appealing interlocutory orders dismissing their class action allegations. The Second Circuit permitted the
appeal in Eisen by formulating the death knell rule. However, the Third
Circuit rejected such a rule and therefore denied an appeal in Hackett.
Since no other circuit to date has faced the issue of whether or not to
adopt the death knell rationale, 40 it is significant that the two circuits

which have considered the question have reached opposite conclusions.
In arriving at its decision, the majority in Hackett approached the
issue as a syllogism in which the conclusion presumably followed logically
from certain premises which purported to be operational boundaries of
the death knell rule. In this fashion, the Third Circuit narrowly confined
33. Id. at 120.
34. Id. at 120-21.
35. 379 U.S. at 152.
36. Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970).
37. 455 F.2d at 621, referring to City of New York v. International Pipe &
Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969).

38. 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
39. Id. at 1306-07.
40. 455 F.2d at 621.
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the operational domain of the Eisen rule, concluding that, within the defined area, existing remedies were adequate to deal with the problem.
Initially, the Hackett court reasoned that, since Snyder v. Harris41 prohibited the aggregation of claims in class actions to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount requirement and since the Second Circuit in Korn had refused
to permit a named plaintiff with an $8,500 individual claim to invoke the
death knell rule, the doctrine would obviously not permit appeal from an
order denying a class action designation in any case in which a party
had a claim exceeding the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for
federal jurisdiction. 42 Therefore, the court's first premise was that the
death knell doctrine would be inapplicable in those cases with diversity of
citizenship as the basis of federal jurisdiction and could be invoked only
within the limited category of federal question cases which proceed without
43
regard to the $10,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy.
After eliminating diversity of citizenship cases and federal question
cases requiring a $10,000 amount in controversy from the operation of the
death knell rule, the Hackett court further restricted the scope of the Eisen
rule by asserting that section 1292 (a) (1) would be the proper avenue of
appeal in cases where the district court's refusal to grant a class action
allegation would constitute a denial of injunctive relief different from that
which could be secured by an individual claiming injunctive relief. 44 Also

eliminated were those cases involving rights incapable of monetary valuation, for the underlying assumption of the rule - no lawyer would represent a claimant with a miniscule monetary claim - would not be applicable in such situations. 45 As a final premise, the Hackett court asserted
that, in the remaining areas of federal question jurisdiction, there would be
many instances in which reasonable attorney's fees could be obtained under
various statutory provisions or would be otherwise recoverable, thus removing the need for the Eisen rule in those cases. 46 Therefore, the majority
concluded that the death knell rationale "will operate primarily if not
exclusively in that class of cases in which attorneys are willing to undertake on a contingent fee basis class actions for the recovery of money
damages for claimed violations of federal regulatory statutes. '47
After satisfying itself that the potential use of the death knell rule
was extremely limited, the court determined that adoption of the rule was
41. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). Snyder precludes the aggregation of claims that are
separate and distinct, but it does allow aggregation where the class members have
a single right or title in the common, undivided subject matter of the suit. Id. at
335-36.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
43. 455 F.2d at 622. Among the federal statutory causes of action for which
there is no jurisdictional amount requirement are those involving civil rights, Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 n.1 (1968), and private anti-trust, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
44. 455 F.2d at 622.
45. Id. at 622.
46. Id. The Hackett court further asserted that publicly supported legal service
organizations would accept some small but important claims. Id. at 623.
47. Id. at 623.
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unwarranted since the existing remedies of section 1292(b), rule 54(b),
and mandamus provided sufficient relief in such cases without resorting to
the Eisen rule. 48 An analysis of the reasoning in Hackett reveals that
the majority's conclusion regarding the operational limitations of the death
knell rule is based upon premises which are substantially fallacious.
The Hackett majority's first premise, namely the decision in Korn,
was a departure from the reasoning in Eisen. The Eisen rule was based
upon the balancing test enunciated in Dickinson and in Gillespie, by which
the inconveniences and costs of piecemeal review were weighed against
the danger of a denial of justice from delaying the appeal until a final
judgment on the merits. 49 As was cogently argued by the Hackett dissent, 50
this balancing test contemplated nothing so insensitive and arbitrary as
the automatic dollar amount test employed in Korn and other Second
Circuit decisions.51 There are numerous situations in which an interlocutory appeal might be necessary to a fair disposition of the case, regardless
of the amount of the named plaintiff's claim. For example, a named plaintiff
having initiated a class action in order to reduce expenses and having a
claim sufficiently large to warrant his pursuit of the action to a final judgment, despite a denial of class action designation, may, upon succeeding on
the merits, decline to appeal the order rather than incur the cost of the
appeal should he fail to win a reversal. As a result, the other members of
48. Id. at 624.

49. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966). Relying on
Gillespie, the Eisen court stated:

[I]n deciding the question of finality the most important competing considerations
are "the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the
danger of denying justice by delay on the other."
Id. at 120.
50. 455 F.2d at 629-30 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
51. The Second Circuit distinguished Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n,
422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970), from Eisen on the basis of the difference in the size
of the claims of the named plaintiffs in the respective class actions. 422 F.2d at 143.
In Eisen the court had reasoned that the individual claim of the plaintiff was so

small that it would be economically unfeasible to pursue the action on an individual
basis. Since a dismissal of the appeal of the order denying class action designation
was tantamount to a termination of the litigation, the court allowed an immediate
appeal. 370 F.2d at 120-21. On the other hand, the Cecares court determined that
the plaintiffs had adequate resources to pursue the action alone and had sufficiently
high claims to warrant maintenance of the suit on an individual basis. 422 F.2d at 144.
However, both Caceres and City of New York v. International Pipe &
Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969), are deficient in their use of precedent,
for the courts therein relied on decisions under rule 23 before the 1966 amendments
to the rule. Prior to 1966, a class action had no res judicata effect on class members
other than the litigating plaintiffs. As such, rule 23 was little more than a device
for permissive joinder, for subsequent intervenors did not have to establish an
independent jurisdictional basis. Therefore, it is understandable that "spurious" class
actions were considered no more appealable than denials of permissive intervention.
However, under the res judicata provisions now incorporated in rule 23(b)(3) class
actions, all members of the class who have not affirmatively requested exemption
are bound by the judgment. Unlike a permissive joinder device, rule 23 now enables
the named plaintiff to represent and to bind the class. Thus, the pre-1966 cases
relied on by the Second Circuit in Caceres and International Pipe do not justify a
dismissal of an appeal from an order denying class action designation. Note,
Interlocutory Appeal From Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 COLUM.
L. REV. 1292, 1300 (1970).
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the proposed class would be left without a representative. On the other
hand, if the named plaintiff does appeal the order after prevailing on the
merits and succeeds on the appeal, he may be required to prosecute another
trial. Otherwise, the successful appeal would permit members of the class
to join in the action at a time when they already know its outcome, a
result additionally unfair to the defendant since it would mean a judgment
significantly larger in amount than the liability which he contested at
the trial.52 Therefore, there is no sound legal basis for arbitrarily confining
the death knell rule to cases where the named plaintiff's individual claim
is below the $8,500 limit established in Korn and, as a result, no basis for
precluding the Eisen rule from operating in diversity cases and federal
question cases requiring the $10,000 amount in controversy.
The Hackett court's contention that the death knell doctrine was unnecessary with respect to appeals from interlocutory orders involving
injunctive relief because section 1292(a) (1) adequately handled such cases
was based on cases such as Brunson v. Board of Trustees.5 " In Brunson,
the injunction originally sought had not been granted as a result of the
district court's denial of class action designation, and only a significantly
narrower injunction was available if the named plaintiff prosecuted the
case solely on his own behalf. In this context the Fourth Circuit held
appealable the order striking the class action designation.54 However,
under the Brunson rationale, the efficacy of section 1292(a) (1) is limited
exclusively to civil rights cases, since, in areas such as consumer protection and antitrust, an injunction issued on behalf of a single plaintiff is
likely to be as broad as one issued on behalf of an entire class. 5 As an
illustration of this point, Brunson involved a civil rights action based on
racial discrimination and was originally brought as a class action seeking
injunctive relief in the form of a general reorganization of the school
system. The district court order denying the class action limited each
plaintiff to an individual action on his own behalf; the denial of the class
action narrowed the scope of possible injunctive relief to the point of
requiring the admission of a particular plaintiff to a school of his choice.56
On the other hand, in the antitrust area, while all individuals threatened
with injury may sue for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton
Act "and while they may theoretically do so simultaneously against the
same persons for the same violations, the fact is that one injunction is as
effective as 100, and, concomitantly, that 100 injunctions are no more
52. Note, supra note 51, at 1293-94. Rule 23 does not preclude class actions on
behalf of numerous large claimants, although it is assumed that such claimants would
sue alone. A class action permits the suits to be tried together when joinder is
impracticable. Id. at 1294.
53. 311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962). See also Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Note, Interlocutory Appeals From Orders Staying
Proceedings, 21 Sw. L.J. 850 (1967).
54. 311 F.2d at 108.
55. Note, supra note 51, at 1297.
56. 311 F.2d at 108.
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effective than one." 57 Therefore, if, hypothetically speaking, there were a
conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act and a single individual sued for an injunction to enjoin the
conspiracy, then the relief granted would be an injunction against the
entire conspiracy and not an injunction limited to the extent that the
conspiracy affected the single plaintiff. Therefore, as the courts have interpreted section 1292(a)(1), the efficacy of that statute, as an avenue
of appeal for class action denials, will be restricted to areas such as civil
rights where the denial of the class as a party effects the substantive scope
of the relief granted.
Another judicial limitation on the scope of section 1292(a) (1) is
'that the mere presence of words of restraint or direction in an order
that is only a step in an action does not make § 1292(a)(1) applicable .

. . .' "5

Consistent with the traditional concept of finality, courts

have interpreted this statute as allowing appeals only from injunctions
going to the substantive relief sought in a complaint, as opposed to restraints on matters unrelated to the substantive issues in the action. In
other words, restraints imposed or denied on collateral issues are not
appealable under this provision.59 Under such a construction, it is conceivable that the issue of broad injunctive relief, sought prior to the denial
of a class action (an issue collateral in nature) where such denial has the
effect of narrowing the injunctive relief available, would also be considered
a collateral issue by circuits other than the Fourth Circuit, and therefore
would not be appealable under section 1292 (a) (1).
The final premise in the majority's syllogism was that there are many
federal statutes, such as section 4 of the Clayton Act employed by the
plaintiff in the present case, which provide recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and thus remove the rationale for the death knell rule. Implicit
in this statement is the assertion that the denial of a class action designation will not preclude a suit by a small claimant. However, as a general
rule, litigants may not recover attorney's fees absent specific statutory
authority or contractual agreement. 0 Although there are several federal
statutes which expressly provide for the recovery of reasonable attorney's
fees, it is significant to note that they are heavily outnumbered by causes
of action for which there is no such provision. 6' The statutes providing
57. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972).
58. Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers, Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 774
(2d Cir. 1972).
59. Id. In International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir.
1963), the court stated:
We think it better, in line with our prior decisions, to continue to read
§ 1292(a) (1) as relating to injunctions which give or aid in giving some or all
of the substantive relief sought by a complaint . . . and not as including restraints or directions in orders concerning the conduct of the parties or their
counsel, unrelated to the substantive issues in the action, while awaiting trial.
60. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
61. There are 43 federal statutes which expressly provide for recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees. See U.S.C.A., General Index (A to B) 490-91 (1971).
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for such recovery are generally limited to federal regulatory statutes, such
as section 4 of the Clayton Act,12 section 11(e) of the Securities Act of
1933, 68 section 18(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934,64 and Titles II
and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.65
An exception, derived from the policy against unjust enrichment, has
developed in the areas of derivative suits and class actions to permit recovery of a fee award if the successful shareholders' suit or class action
has "substantially benefited" the corporation or class.6 6 Because the underlying principal of the "fund" or "substantial benefit theory" is unjust enrichment, the corporation or class must actually be enriched. Since the
class or corporation recovers if the suit is successful, equity requires that
the corporation or the class pay for the expenses of litigation.67 However,
since a finding of substantial benefit to the class is a condition precedent
to the award of attorney's fees and since, in those cases where the class
action designation is denied, there will be no class to be benefited, the
prospect of recovering attorney's fees in an individual action is rendered
illusory unless, as in Hackett, the applicable statute expressly provides
for such recovery.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)(3) (1970).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1970).
66. Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 365,
101 N.W.2d 423, 426 (1960).
Among the criticisms of awarding attorney's fees, even where a substantial
benefit is conferred, are: (1) the availability of fee awards may encourage champerty;
(2) fee awards may increase the number of merely vexatious suits; (3) the unpredictability of litigation is an adequate risk for bringing or defending a lawsuit;
(4) the courts should not be encumbered with the collateral issue of determining
reasonable attorney's fees; and (5) where a statute provides express remedies, other
remedies should not readily be implied. Note, Securities Regulation - Allowance
of Attorney's Fees in 14(a) Derivative Suits, 49 N.C.L. REv. 204, 210-13 (1970).
67. One commentator has explained this exception as follows:
Courts have traditionally recognized that it is inequitable for one party to
bear the entire expense of securing a group benefit. . . . [Since] the totality
of shareholders is generally recognized as constituting the corporation, and since
it is the corporation that recovers in a successful derivative suit, then logically
litigation expenses should be apportioned among all the shareholders. This
apportionment can be mechanically accomplished by an award of attorneys' fees
against the corporation.
Note, supra note 66, at 207.
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court
stressed that the attorney's fees were not being awarded against an adverse party
but were imposed on "the class that has benefited from them and that would have
had to pay them had it brought the suit." Id. at 396-97. In Kahan v. Rosenstiel,
424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970), the Third Circuit went
beyond Mills by allowing recovery of attorney's fees from adverse parties. The court
held that although a substantial benefit had been conferred upon the members of the
plaintiff's class, the wrongful conduct of the defendant prevented the creation of a
fund from which the court could have granted attorney's fees to the plaintiff.
Therefore, it was within the district court's discretion to impose attorney's fees upon
the defendant. Id. at 174. In light of the express language in Mills which disfavors
assessment of attorney's fees against the losing party, it is doubtful that courts will
be eager to find the exceptional conduct warranting such an award. 36 Mo. L. Ray.
292, 300 (1971).
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Within the narrow framework which it deemed to be the operational
limits of the death knell doctrine, the Third Circuit in Hackett balanced
the extension of the deterrent policies behind the private enforcement
provisions of the federal regulatory statutes, implicit in rule 23, against
section 1291's competing policy which intended to protect the federal
appellate courts from being overwhelmed by interlocutory appeals. Against
interlocutory appellate review as of right, the court weighed the effectiveness of alternative discretionary appellate remedies; namely, section
1292(b), rule 54(b), and the writ of mandamus. The court concluded
that these alternative remedies were adequate to protect the plaintiff and
that, therefore, the death knell rule was altogether unnecessary. 6 However, a careful examination of the operative scope of these devices will
expose several inherent deficiencies which render them inadequate as complete substitutes for the death knell doctrine.
As evidenced by the present case,0 9 there are practical difficulties in
applying for section 1292(b) 70 certification to the same court which struck
the class action allegation, for the court "may genuinely believe that its
order did not involve the requisite 'controlling question of law'."' 7 1 Such
practical difficulties may be responsible for the scarcity of cases in which
the application for a section 1292(b) certification has been granted with
respect to a class action order. 72
Another flaw arises from the manner in which section 1292(b) has
been invoked in the past. Problems of predictability and stability have
arisen since district courts may certify interlocutory orders by mere recitation of the statutory language, and courts of appeals may hear a section
1292(b) certification at their discretion without specifying any grounds. 73
Because the courts have consistently failed to announce reasons for their
decisions, attorneys are unable to discern the standards and precise fact
situations which will give rise to section 1292(b) certification. This
presents an impediment to effective trial preparation, for an attorney, unable to determine when section 1292(b) is applicable, may decline to plead
a particular allegation or defense that he otherwise would pursue if he
knew that an avenue of appeal would be available from an unfavorable
interlocutory order on that particular point.
Moreover, the assertion has been made that section 1292(b) is not
designed to provide review of class action orders, since the cases suggest
that:
[The statutory]

requirement

that "immediate appeal

.

.

.

may

materially advance" the litigation's termination means that the order
68. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 623-24 (3d Cir. 1972).
69. The district court refused to grant section 1292(b) certification. Id. at 620.
70. See note 4 supra.
71. Note, supra note 51, at 1296.
72. Only one case has been found. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
73. Note, supra note 10, at 377-78.
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must involve "the critical issue in [the] case" and that it must have
some potential for affecting the court's determination of the merits.
either, would thus appear unsuitable
Class action orders rarely doing
74
for section 1292(b) treatment.
It is apparent that section 1292(b) was not intended to provide appeal
from interlocutory orders determining issues collateral to the merits of the
case. A collateral issue, such as the propriety of a class action allegation,
is by definition something distinct from the cause of action which is the
critical issue in the case. Similarly, an appeal from an unfavorable adjudication of a collateral issue will not materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation because the merits have yet to be adjudicated. In
point of fact, the refusal to certify an appeal from a class action denial,
where the named plaintiff's claim is too insignificant to warrant individual
action, would, for all intents and purposes, terminate the litigation which
section 1292(b) was expressly designed to facilitate. As may be inferred
from the infrequency with which it has been successfully invoked for such
purposes, section 1292(b) is not a suitable alternative for granting appellate
review of class action denials. There is little strength in the Hackett court's
argument that it is a satisfactory alternative to the death knell doctrine.
In regard to rule 54(b) as an alternative remedy to the death knell
doctrine, it is imperative to note the rule's limited efficacy. In litigation
involving multiple claims or multiple parties, rule 54(b) allows the district
judge, in his discretion, to grant final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties.7 5 Under this rule, the Supreme
Court has held that a judgment on one transaction or occurrence and a
separate claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence may be
reviewed.76 In this regard, the concept of finality embraced in section 1291
is not impaired by rule 54(b) :
An order, judgment, or decree which leaves the rights of the parties
to the suit affected by it undetermined - one which does not substantially and completely determine the rights of the parties affected
by it in that suit - is not reviewable here until a final decision is rendered, nor is an order retaining or dismissing parties defendant, who are
17
charged to be jointly liable to the complainant in the suit, appealable.
Rule 54(b) neither affects the concept of finality required by section 1291
nor supersedes any statute controlling appellate jurisdiction.78 In addition,
the utility of rule 54(b) is limited, inasmuch as it is applicable only to
multiple party or multiple claim litigation. Also a district court's rule
74. Note, supra note 51, at 1297 (citations omitted). See generally Switzerland

Cheese Ass'n v. E. Horne's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 25 (1966) ; Belusko v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 308 F.2d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1962).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
76. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436-38 (1956).
77. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 190 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir.
1951), quoting, Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1894).
78. 351 U.S. at 436-38.
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54(b) certificate is not jurisdictionally binding on the court of appeals,
for the lower court cannot confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals
79
where jurisdiction does not exist.
Moreover, the most significant criticism of rule 54(b) as an alternative to the death knell doctrine is that the preponderance of authority
holds that rule 54(b) is inapplicable to interlocutory orders determining
collateral issues.8 0 The majority of jurisdictions which have considered
the question interpret the term "claim for relief," as used in rule 54(b), to
be synonymous with "cause of action," for throughout the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the words "claim," "claim for relief," and "cause of
action" are used interchangeably. 8' Therefore, in a case involving a single
cause of action, if an issue collateral to that cause of action should arise,
rule 54(b) has no application since the action does not involve multiple
82
claims as required by the rule.

Because a class action allegation is an issue collateral to the cause of
action, it is not a "claim for relief" within the meaning of rule 54(b). As
such, when a class action is denied, the rights and liabilities of the members of the proposed class are not finally adjudicated. Therefore, rule
54(b) is not available as an avenue of appeal from an interlocutory order
denying a class action allegation.
The final alternative remedy considered by the Hackett court was the
writ of mandamus, currently authorized by section 1651 of the Judicial
Code. 88 Although prior to the enactment of section 1292(b) the Supreme
Court, in Ex parte Peru, 4 had implied a broader use of the writ to achieve
interlocutory review through reasoned discretion, subsequent cases revealed
that the Court's language did not facilitate procurement of writs of man79. Note, 37 J. AIR L. & Com. 133, 135-36 (1971). See generally La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Bush v. United Benefit Fire Ins. Co.,
311 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1963).
80. 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.31, at 472-73 (2d ed. 1971). See generally
Redding & Co. v. Russwine Constr. Corp., 417 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; Chabot v.
National Sec. & Research Corp., 290 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1961).
81. 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.31, at 471-72 (2d ed. 1971).
82. Id. at 471-73 (citations omitted). As regards multiple claims actions,
Professor Moore stated:
Since Rule 54(b) never applies in a single claim action where multiple
parties are not involved, only in a multiple claims or multiple parties action can
the question properly arise as to whether the Rule as opposed to the Cohen
doctrine applies. In such a case if the order sought to be appealed finally disposes
of at least one cause of action, or finally adjudicates all of the rights and
liabilities of a party in the action, then Rule 54(b) applies. If in such a case...
the order is a final disposition of a claimed right, which is not an ingredient
of a cause of action and does not require consideration with it, but rather is
separable from and collateral to the cause of action, then the Cohen doctrine is
on point.
Id. at 474-75.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970). "'A writ of mandamus is a command issuing
from a superior court to some inferior court of judicature, corporation, or public
officer, requiring them to do some particular act, therein specified, which appertains
to their office and duty.''" Borough of Ansonia v. Studley, 67 Conn. 170, 176, 34 A.
1030, 1030 (1895).
84. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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damus.8 5 Additionally, some authorities have contended that the enactment
of section 1292(b) and the limited number of cases which have expressed
a desire to broaden discretionary review by way of the extraordinary writs
militate against a significant change in their availability. 86 It is conceivable
that mandamus could issue where a court of appeals finds that the district
court has abused its discretion by failure to certify under section 1292(b)
or under rule 54(b). However, as was recently stated by the Second
Circuit, "we do not - indeed may not - issue mandamus with respect
to orders resting in the district court's discretion, save in most extraordi"87 From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
nary circumstances . *...
mandamus offers a considerably more limited avenue of appeal than is
available under the Eisen rule.
After satisfying itself that it had adequately disposed of the death
knell rule, the Hackett court further asserted that it would not expand the
Cohen collateral order doctrine to serve the same purpose as the death
knell rule.88 The court failed to consider, however, that no extension of
the Cohen doctrine was necessary in order to bring the present case within
its purview. The Supreme Court in Cohen, in deciding on the finality of
the district court's order denying application of the security bond statute
of the forum state, reasoned that the prohibitions of section 1291 disallowed
appeal from any decision which was tentative or incomplete and also precluded review of fully consummated decisions where they were but steps
toward a final judgment in which they would merge.8 9 The Court further
determined: (1) that the defendant's application for use of the statute
was concluded, (2) that the order of the district court was not a step
toward final disposition of the merits, (3) that the order would not be
merged in a final judgment, and (4) that review of the order after a final
judgment on the merits would serve no purpose since the rights of the
appellant would be irreparably lost. 90 In adopting a pragmatic rather than
technical test of finality, the Court concluded:
[T]he matters embraced in the decision appealed from are not of such
an interlocutory nature as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the
merits of this case.
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of
85. See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943); Clinton
Foods v. United States, 188 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 825
(1951).
86. Note, supra note 10, at 368-69.
87. Weight Watchers, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 775
(2d Cir. 1972), quoting, Doulon Indus., Inc. v. Forts, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir.
1968).
88. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 1972).
89. 337 U.S. at 546.
90. Id.
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the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred
until the whole case is adjudicated."1
Beyond the concept of irreparable harm which the Cohen Court explicitly accepted as a prerequisite of finality, an inference can be drawn that
there are decisions which are final in the sense of being collateral to the
cause of action, ripe for review, and sufficiently important to the develop92
ment of the case to justify immediate consideration by the appellate court.
To be collateral, an issue must be completely unrelated to the substantive
law of the cause of action so that, even if the collateral issue did not exist,
the resolution of the cause of action would be no different. 93 In Cohen, the
causes of action were fraud and mismanagement, while the collateral issue
was whether a federal court was obliged to apply a statute of the forum
state which required the plaintiff, in advance of trial, to post a security
bond to cover the defendant's reasonable attorney's fees in the event of
the plaintiff's loss. 9 4 Clearly a determination of the security bond issue in

Cohen was not related to the substantive law of fraud or mismanagement
and would not be substantially determinative of these issues.
Ripeness, the second element of the Cohen doctrine, is established
where the order in question completely adjudicates an independent reviewable unit which is not so integrated with the basic issues of the action that
interlocutory review would be premature95 and in which review cannot
await final judgment on the merits because the collateral rights involved
may be irretrievably lost through delay. 96 In Cohen, the security to the
defendant derived from the bond statute would have been irreparably lost
if appeal of that issue had to await a final judgment of the merits. After a
final determination of the cause of action in the defendant's favor, it might
have been discovered that the plaintiff did not have sufficient funds to cover
the defendant's attorney's fees.
When viewed in this context of the Cohen rationale, it is significant
to note that a class action allegation presents a classic collateral issue. "The
right of the named plaintiff to represent an alleged class is clearly distinct
from, and independent of, the merits of his claim and the question whether
he has that right will generally be separable from the factual issues necessarily to be determined at trial." 97 Furthermore, the element of ripeness is
satisfied, however, because once the class action is denied, this right will
be irretrievably lost if appeal must await a final judgment on the merits. 98
91. Id.
92. Note, supra note 51, at 1302-03.

93. 337 U.S. at 546.

94. Id. at 543.
95. Note, supra note 51, at 1302-03.
96. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 627 (3d Cir. 1972) (Rosenn,
3., dissenting).
97. Note, supra note 51, at 1303.
98. Another consideration involves the rights of the members of the proposed
class. After a class action denial, a subsequent adjudication of the merits is binding
on the defendant only to the extent of the named plaintiff's individual claim; the
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As a third condition of finality, the Cohen Court indicated that, before
an interlocutory order is appealable under section 1291, it must involve
important rights. In Cohen, importance was determined primarily from
the fact that the litigation might well have ended but for the interlocutory
appeal. 9 This criteria of importance is equally applicable in cases where
class action allegations have been stricken and the named plaintiff's individual claim is so small that the costs of the litigation are prohibitive
for him to proceed alone.
As argued in the dissenting opinion in Hackett, the present case
satisfied the collateral issue, ripeness, and importance tests of Cohen.100
The district court's determination that the class was unmanageable did not
involve the substantive issue of whether the defendants had engaged in a
price fixing conspiracy. As to ripeness and importance, the decision on
manageability was completely determinative, and absent immediate appeal,
the right to bring a class action would have been irretrievably lost. Furthermore, the denial of class action designation had so significantly affected
the subsequent conduct of the litigation that, for all practical purposes, the
action would have been terminated if no appeal were available. As the
dissenting opinion pointed out:
[I]t is inconceivable that either the lawyers or the court' will give a
$9.00 [individual] suit the same consideration and attention due a
class action involving hundreds of thousands of persons and many
millions of dollars in potential damages. 1°1
Beyond the applicability of the Cohen doctrine, the Hackett court
failed to consider the impact of Dickinson and Gillespie on the facts of
the present case. Although the balancing test enunciated in those cases
was applied to interlocutory orders relating to the merits of the actions, it
is significant to note that the Eisen court specifically relied on this balancing test to determine the finality of an interlocutory order determining a
collateral issue in that case. 10 2 This application of the Dickinson doctrine
reveals that the balancing test was not intended to be confined exclusively
to orders involving the merits. In view of this application, it is necessary to
examine the Dickinson balancing test as an avenue of appeal for class action
denials, completely distinct and separate from the collateral order doctrine.
The Dickinson rationale considered an order final where the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review were outweighed by the danger of
claims of the other members of the proposed class do not become a part of the
judgment against the defendant. The net result is that all of these potential
plaintiffs have irretrievably lost the right to have a judgment against the defendant
without bringing individual actions.
99. Note, supra note 51, at 1303-04. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania
Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950).
100. 455 F.2d at 627-28 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).

101. Id. at 628 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
102. See note 49 supra.
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denying justice from delaying appeal until a final determination of the
merits.' 0 3 Where, as in the present case, a class action is denied leaving
a named plaintiff with an individual claim so miniscule that no lawyer of
competence would accept the case, the denial of justice resulting therefrom
is arguably sufficient to outweigh the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal
review. Under such circumstances, there would be no trial and the alleged
wrongdoer would indirectly avoid an unfavorable judgment which he might
otherwise deserve. Certainly, this is precisely the form of injustice contemplated in Dickinson.
Because the death knell rule announced in Eisen may be viewed
simply as a manifestation of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cohen and
Dickinson and since the rule required no expansion of the holdings of those
cases,' 04 it is submitted that the Hackett court's rejection of the Eisen
doctrine is tantamount to a tacit rejection of those opinions. If this is the
case, then the Hackett court was precluded from rejecting the death knell
rule unless it could show the rule was not required by the aforementioned
Supreme Court decisions.
In light of the fact that only the Second and Third Circuits have had
occasion to consider the death knell issue, 105 even though the doctrine was
first articulated in 1966,106 the impact of the Hackett decision in other
jurisdictions may not be significant. The Tenth Circuit has stated that,
although "the resolution of the class action issue . ..places an onerous
burden on the trial court .. .if there is to be an error made, let it be in

favor and not against the maintenance of the class action, for it is always
subject to modification should later developments during the course of the
trial so require.' 07 Such language is indicative of a judicial climate, in at
least the Tenth Circuit, favorable to the adoption of the death knell doctrine.
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's inclination toward permissive appealability of orders denying class actions, the Second Circuit, in recent
opinions, appears to be leaning away from its own death knell rule. In
Korn, though specifically preserving the death knell rule as it applied to
the fact situation of Eisen, the court declined to expand the doctrine. The
court commented that:
[T]he arguments for a rule of broad appealability from refusals to
designate a class are "not without force" .
[b]ut the logical end
103. See note 29 and acompanying text supra.
104. 370 F.2d at 120. After quoting the balancing test as it appeared in Gillespie,
the court indicated that denial of the appeal in Eisen so far outweighed the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review that:
[T]hese considerations, rather than being "competitive," lead to a single conclusion - that the order dismissing this class action is appealable. The alternatives
are to appeal now or to end the lawsuit for all practical purposes. [The] order "if
unreviewed, will put an end to the action."
Id.
105. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1972).
106. 370 F.2d at 120-21.
107. Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 394 U.S. 928

(1969).
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of such arguments is . . ."that an order refusing class action treatment ...

should almost always be appealable." . . . This runs directly

contrary to the public policy of the final judgment rule embodied in
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the sound reasons for it ....108
More recently, the Second Circuit held that "Cohen must be kept within
narrow bounds, lest this exception swallow the salutary 'final judgment'
rule."' 0 9 In spite of this restricting language, the death knell rule continues
in the Second Circuit as a viable doctrine, at least within the fact situation
of Eisen. However, the Hackett court appears to have built on the later
Second Circuit cases and to have made them the point of departure for a
total rejection of the death knell doctrine. If the logical resolution of this
issue necessitates asking whether the Second Circuit, with the advantage
of hindsight, would have adopted the death knell rule in the first place,
then a negative answer should indicate that other circuits will follow the
lead of the Third Circuit in rejecting the death knell doctrine.
However, it is submitted that the legal foundations of Cohen, Gillespie,
Dickinson, and, therefore, Eisen are still viable and would continue to
support the adoption of the death knell doctrine in other circuits. Furthermore, as previously stated, the death knell rule may be viewed as nothing
more than an application of the Supreme Court's reasoning, embodied in
Cohen and Dickinson, to orders denying class action allegations where the
named plaintiff's claim is monetarily insignificant, and as such, the doctrine
requires no expansion of Cohen or Dickinson in order to sustain its viability.
In this light, other circuits confronted by the issue should consider themselves bound to adopt the death knell rule.
Donald F. Jacobs
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United States ex rel. Rodrigues v. McGinnis (2d Cir. 1972).
The petitioner, while incarcerated in a New York state prison,' filed
a pro se petition under the civil rights statutes 2 alleging that he had been
108. 443 F.2d at 1305, citing, Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 422 F.2d
141, 143 (2d Cir. 1970).
109. Weight Watchers, Inc. v.Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773
(2d Cir. 1972).
1. The petitioner, at the time of the alleged unconstitutional actions, was
serving an indeterminate term of one and one-half to four years in Sing Sing
prison pursuant to a judgment rendered by a Bronx County court. United States
ex rel. Rodriquez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627, 631 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 451
F.2d 730 (1971), rev'd, __ F.2d ---(2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
2. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 offers a private federal remedy
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unconstitutionally deprived of good behavior time credit.3 He sought reinstatement of the good behavior time credit and, since such reinstatement,
if granted, would entitle him to release, he petitioned simultaneously for
a writ of habeas corpus. 4 The federal district court granted the requested
relief. 5 The court of appeals, in its initial hearing, disagreed with the
district court's holding that the writ of habeas corpus was only incidental
to the enforcement of any judgment which might issue on the petition,
and held that the petitioner, in seeking release from custody, was in essence
applying for a writ of habeas corpus, and therefore must exhaust his
for deprivation of federally provided rights by one acting under color of state law.
Section one states:

That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person
within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall,
any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the
contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law,
suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress ....
17 Stat. 13.
This Act itself did not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in cases
where the plaintiff alleged violation of its provisions. However, such jurisdiction
was conferred, in substantially similar language, by the Act of March 3, 1911, ch.
231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1092, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), which states in
pertinent part that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows:
Fourteenth. Of all suits at law or in equity authorized by law to be
brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, of any right, privilege, or
immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right
secured by any law of the United States providing for equal rights of citizens
of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.
36 Stat. 1092.
Named as defendants were the Commissioner of Correction, the Chairman
of the Board of Parole, and the Warden and Chairman of the Prison Board of
Clinton State Prison to which petitioner had been transferred subsequent to the
time of the actions challenged. These defendants were within the purview of the
statute since the Supreme Court had held, in cases involving 18 U.S.C. § 242, the
criminal counterpart to section 1983, that those conferred with power by virtue
of a state law, or clothed with the authority of state law, were acting "under color"
of state law as required by the statute. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
3. Under N.Y. CORREc. LAW § 83 (McKinney Supp. 1968), and N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 70.30(4)(b),
70.40(1)(a), 70.40(1)(b) (McKinney 1967), prisoners may
participate in a conditional release program under which they can earn up to ten
days per month "good time" which serves to reduce the maximum term of their
sentences. Thus the prisoner who maximizes his "good time" credit can earn his
release after serving approximately two-thirds of his sentence. However, "good time"
credit may be withdrawn at any time, in whole or in part, for bad behavior or violation
of prison rules, and good time may not be earned while the prisoner is in segregation.
N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 83(1) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
In the instant case petitioner was deprived of 120 days of "good time" for
possessing five contraband letters and six pornographic photographs of his wife.
United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F. Supp. 627, 631 (N.D.N.Y.
1969).
4. 307 F. Supp. at 627. A state prisoner brings a habeas corpus suit into
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
5. 307 F. Supp. at 627. The district court found that "the approved and short
cut procedures" utilized by the prison officials to withdraw petitioner's good time
credit "did not permit fair hearing or proper consideration to such extent that
would accord with ordinary due process requirements." Id. at 632.
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state remedies before proceeding in a federal forum.6 In a rehearing en7
banc the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
its prior decision and reinstated the district court's decision, holding that
petitioner's pleading, although cognizable in federal habeas corpus, could
also be read as stating a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, and that therefore petitioner was entitled to have his pleading read
as having been made pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, thus circumventing
the habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. United States ex rel. Rodriguez

v. McGinnis, --- F.2d --- (2d Cir. 1972).
In 1871, a Virginia court" stated the long-enduring judicial attitude
toward the rights of prisoners: "[h]e [the convicted felon] has, as a
consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal
rights except those which the law in its humanity accords him. He is for
the time being the slave of the State." This attitude, or at least its results,
has been perpetuated in the courts by what is known as the "hands-off'
doctrine, 10 which provides that "[c]ourts are without power to supervise
prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or
regulations."" More recently, the courts have been increasingly willing
to recognize that the doctrine, although not to be abandoned entirely, should
be balanced against the possibilities of abuse of constitutional rights if the
courts continue to totally abstain from prisoners'

12
civil rights suits.

However, the state prisoner seeking to present his grievances to a federal
forum has found his procedural arsenal rather limited.' 8 Relief is most
frequently sought by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or by an action
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Initially, habeas corpus was regarded as a method by which a person
could obtain his release when restrained pursuant to a judgment rendered
by a court without jurisdiction. 14 Thus a petitioner, seeking habeas corpus
6. United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971).
7. United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, __ F.2d __ (2d Cir. 1972)
(en banc). Actually, the en banc proceedings considered the appeals of two petitioners in addition to that of petitioner Rodriguez. The allegations of the three
petitions, however, were precisely the same in that all complained of an unconstitutional
deprivation of good time credit. For the sake of simplicity, this note concerns itself
only with Rodriguez' petition. Id. at _
8. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871).
9. Id. at 796.
10. Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 Gzo. L.J. 1270, 1273-74
(1969); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
11. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859
(1954). See United States ex rel. Cambell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55, 57 (7th Cir. 1968)
Jones v. Peyton, 294 F. Supp. 173, 176 (E.D. Va. 1968).
12. See Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962) ; Comment, supra note 10. See also United States ex rel.
Cambell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55, 57 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519,
522 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
13. See Note, supra note 10, at 1273.
14. See Developments in the Law - FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1038, 1040 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Developments - Federal Habeas
Corpus]; Note, Habeas Corpus - Coram Nobis - Remedies Available to Validly
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relief due to the conditions or manner of his confinement, found this
procedure unavailable because he was not seeking total release1 5 pursuant
to a challenge to the validity of his confinement based on a lack of
jurisdiction in the trial court.'
In 1867, the federal courts were given habeas corpus jurisdiction
over state prisoners whose petitions raised constitutional questions tinder
the fourteenth amendment. 17 In Ex parte Royall,18 the first case to be
heard by the Supreme Court under the 1867 Act, 19 the Court added yet
another barrier to a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition - exhaustion.
The effect of this requirement, eventually codified in 1948,20 was to
Sentenced Prisoners Who Are Mistreated by State Penal Authorities, 33 NEB. L.
REV. 434 (1954). See also Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830).
For purposes of determining the propriety of a court's jurisdiction, courts
have considered deprivation of certain constitutional rights, such as the right to
counsel, to be jurisdictional defects. See Note, supra, at 435. See also Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101. 105 (1942).
15. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 159 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1947), rev'd on
other grounds, 334 U.S. 266 (1948) ; McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) ; Ex parte
Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alas. 1951).
16. The federal courts have rejected the use of habeas corpus as a proceeding
to obtain relief unrelated to the validity of the confinement. See, e.g., Long v.
Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen,
337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965).
17. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
Actually, the federal writ had previously been made available to certain classes of
state prisoners. Act of August 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (certain foreign nationals
held by state or federal authorities) ; Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634
(persons held in state custody for acts pursuant to federal law). Habeas corpus
relief is also provided in the Constitution: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
Public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. For an enlightened sketch
of habeas corpus as it evolved from its common law roots, see R. SOKOL, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS 3-18 (2d ed. 1969).
18. 117 U.S. 241 (1886). The Court held that, in the interest of preserving
harmony between the state and federal governments, the federal courts should require state prisoners to bring their petitions for habeas corpus relief into the state
courts before the federal courts exercise their jurisdiction, but that this requirement
would be subordinated to special circumstances requiring immediate action.
19. The lapse of time between the passage of the 1867 Act and its initial
Supreme Court interpretation in 1886 is attributable to the fact that the Court's
appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases was removed by the Act of March 27,
1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. The appellate jurisdiction was returned by the Act
of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
20. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 967, codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b) (1970). This section states in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
62 Stat. 967.
The statute was intended to reflect existing case law, particularly Ex parte
Hawke, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), wherein the Court held that the petitioner had to
exhaust all state remedies, including appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, before his habeas petition could be
presented to a federal forum. Since that time, however, the elements of exhaustion
have been considerably narrowed. In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-50
(1953), the Court held that once a petitioner's grievance is presented to the state
courts, exhaustion does not require the petitioner to present the same contentions
to the same state courts by a different means. See also Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S.
561, 568 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
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compel state prisoners to exhaust existing state administrative remedies
as a prerequisite to seeking a habeas writ in the state courts and the
further exhaustion of state court remedies prior to petitioning a federal
2
court for the writ.

1

The scope of available habeas corpus relief is not defined in the federal
statute 22 and thus in applying the statute, the common law delineations
of available relief must be adopted as they evolve. 23 In recent years, the
relief available under the writ has broadened considerably. A more liberal
interpretation of the scope of the writ was first recognized in the federal
arena by the Sixth Circuit which held, in Coffin v. Reichard,'24 that the
available remedy may be other than "total release," and the basis of the
25
petition may be other than a challenge to the validity of the confinement.
The Coffin court stated:
A prisoner is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus when, though
lawfully in custody, he is deprived of some right to which he is lawfully
entitled even in his confinement, the deprivation of which serves to
or
make his imprisonment more burdensome than the law 2allows
6
curtails his liberty to a greater extent than the law permits.
The Civil Rights Act of 187127 created a civil action for damages
and for equitable relief against any person acting "under color of" state
law who deprived another person of the rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or federal law. Prior to 1961, it was consistently held that a plaintiff seeking relief under the Act had to first
exhaust his state administrative remedies, 28 and, in the area of prisoners'
the Court held that exhaustion does not require an appeal or an application for a
writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
21. Comment, supra note 10, at 510.
22. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55 (1970).
23. See McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934).
24. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
25. The federal courts have granted relief to habeas corpus petitioners who
were not seeking traditional habeas corpus relief. See, e.g., Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d
106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (lack of psychiatric facilities in a juvenile detention home) ;
Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585, 589 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (cruel and inhuman
treatment, denial of access to courts or counsel, and denial of religious freedom).
See also United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir. 1946).
But see Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968), where the court stated:
Traditionally, the writ of habeas corpus has functioned to test the legality of
confinement rather than the manner in which the detention is administered. Thus
habeas corpus is not a proper proceeding to investigate complaints by prisoners of
mistreatment since such complaints do not attack the legality of the confinement.
Id. at 818. See also Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Williams v.
Steel, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), rehearing denied, 194 F.2d 917 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 822 (1952).
Pennsylvania has recently adopted the liberal interpretation of the scope
of habeas corpus. See Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280
A.2d 110 (1971).
26. 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
27. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970). See note 2 supra.
28. See, e.g., Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336, 337 (3d Cir. 1958) ; People v.
Bibb, 252 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Davis v. Arn, 199 F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir.
1952).
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rights, complaints had to first be heard in the state courts.29 In that
year, in a case brought under the Civil Rights Act charging the Chicago
police with an illegal search and detention of the petitioner,30 the Court
stated that "[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy,
and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one
is invoked." 3' In addition, in that same year the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a prisoner's civil rights suit, alleging a denial
of religious freedom, would not be automatically denied an initial hearing
in a federal forum. 3 2 Since 1961, there has been a readily discernible
trend toward extinguishing the exhaustion requirement in civil rights
cases.

33

In those jurisdictions where the scope of habeas relief and the basis
for habeas suits are broadly construed, habeas corpus and civil rights actions
often overlap. For example, if a state prisoner in such a jurisdiction were
seeking relief from cruel and unusual punishment allegedly being administered by the prison authorities, under the Coffin rationale he could
challenge the manner or conditions of his confinement, and this would be
a legitimate basis for a habeas proceeding. In addition, since cruel and
unusual punishment administered by prison authorities is a violation of the
eighth amendment, the prisoner would also be entitled to bring a civil
rights action. The courts, however, have not been sympathetic toward
reading pro se petitions as within the civil rights statutes. Rather, they
avoid such an interpretation whenever possible so that the habeas exhaus3 4
tion requirement of section 2254 will not be circumvented.

29. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957) ; United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen,
213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954); Kelly v. Dowd, 140
F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 783 (1944).
30. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
31. Id. at 183.
32. Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).

33. See, e.g., Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); Damico v. California,
389 U.S. 416 (1967) ; McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Holmes
v. Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). The necessity of exhaustion

in all the various types of suits which can be brought pursuant to the Civil Rights
Act is not a completely settled issue. See 17 VILL. L. REV. 336 (1971). However, in
the area of prisoners' rights, the Supreme Court in Houghton unequivocally held
that a state prisoner need not exhaust his state remedies before his civil rights
suit would be entertained in a federal forum. 392 U.S. at 640.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). See Smartt v. Avery, 411 F.2d 408 (6th Cir.
1969), where the court stated:
The Civil Rights Statute cannot be used by a state prisoner to circumvent
the requirement of the statute providing that habeas corpus shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the state.
Id. at 409. See also Peinado v. Adult Authority, 405 F.2d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969); Johnson v. Walker, 317 F.2d 418, 419-20 (5th
Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Bibb, 249 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1957) ; King v. McGinnis,
289 F. Supp. 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Pa.
1942).
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In Wilwording v. Swenson,"5 the Supreme Court held that the petitioners' habeas corpus petitions, although cognizable in federal habeas
corpus, could also be read to state causes of action pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. Therefore, the Court concluded that the petitioners
were entitled to have their petitions read as civil rights pleadings not
subject to the habeas corpus exhaustion requirements."6
In the instant case, the circuit court had originally read petitioner's
pleading, denominated "Civil Rights," as actually constituting a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust
state remedies. On rehearing en banc, although there was no majority
opinion, nine of the twelve judges before whom the case was argued agreed
that Wilwording controlled and required the petitioner's pleading to be
87
read as made pursuant to the Civil Rights Act.
Most federal courts, in the interest of comity, have consistently favored
reading a prisoner's petition as habeas corpus whenever possible"8 in order
to require exhaustion. Wilwording is in direct contrast to this preference,
and, if the Rodriguez interpretation is correct, requires a civil rights reading
whenever possible.

35. 404 U.S. 249 (per curiam), rev'g 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1971). The
petitioners' state habeas petitions had been dismissed because the petitioners were
challenging the conditions and manner of confinement rather than seeking total
release. The petitioners then sought federal habeas relief, but the district court
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust a number of alternate state remedies
such as a writ of prohibition, a writ of mandamus, or a declaratory judgment. 439
F.2d at 1335. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1331.
The Supreme Court reversed on two grounds, holding that the petitioners need not
exhaust because exhaustion would probably be futile and that, in any event, the
petitioners were entitled to have their pleadings read as made pursuant to the civil
rights statutes, thus circumventing the habeas exhaustion requirement. 404 U.S. at
250-51.
It is submitted that the second ground for reversal was not dependent on
the first. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[tihe Court does not
rest its reversal on this ground [i.e., the first ground] . . . for it blandly treats
petitioners' habeas corpus petitions as complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . .. .
Id. at 253 (dissenting opinion).
36. 404 U.S. at 251.
37. In his opinion, Chief Judge Friendly, who was joined by Judges Mulligan
and Mansfield, stated:
I do not understand how a state prisoner who is entitled to relief by habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 can opt out of that section, with its attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies when these are available,
simply by styling his petition as one under the Civil Rights Act. But Wilwording
seems to indicate that he can. For that reason I am constrained to concur in
affirming the orders of the district court.
F.2d at _
Judges Waterman, Smith, Kauffman, Feinberg, Oakes, and Timbers concurred in the result. However, they apparently felt that the petition should have
been treated throughout the proceedings as made pursuant to the civil rights acts
rather than as an application for a writ of habeas corpus, for the petition stated
a cause of action cognizable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Thus, they reasoned,
Wilwording was not necessary to avoid exhaustion because the Supreme Court,
since 1961, had consistently held that exhaustion was not necessary in civil rights
cases. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
38. See note 34 supra.
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In Jackson v. Bishop89 and Houghton v. Shafer,40 cited by the Wilwording Court, the petitions were cognizable in habeas corpus, as that
term has come to be defined in the more liberal jurisdictions. 41 In both
cases, however, the petitions were considered as stating causes of action
under the civil rights statutes, and apparently no objection to this treatment was raised by the parties. Thus, these courts ostensibly never confronted the issue of whether it was permissible to read a petition cognizable
in habeas corpus as one also cognizable under the Civil Rights Act. However, even accepting arguendo the proposition that precedent exists for
permitting the civil rights interpretation in cases where the pleadings are
subject to dual interpretation, the Wilwording Court cited no authority for
its further contention that "[petitioners were therefore entitled to have
their actions treated as claims for relief under the Civil Rights Acts

....

,,42

This statement takes the proposition out of the realm of court discretion 43
and into that of judicial requirement.
Although the Rodriguez court felt that under the particular circumstances the civil rights interpretation was mandatory, the court did imply
that, perhaps, Wilwording and Rodriguez could be distinguished. 44 It is
submitted that several distinctions can be made.
39. 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). Petitioners filed homemade petitions employing

various titles, including habeas corpus, seeking to enjoin the use of the strap as a

disciplinary measure in Arkansas prisons. The petitions were originally filed in the
federal district court. After the filing, counsel was appointed and amended complaints submitted which were treated throughout the proceedings, by all concerned,
as petitions for relief under the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28
U.S.C. § 1343. 404 F.2d at 573. Apparently, there was no objection to the treatment
accorded the amended pleadings. Thus, the court never addressed itself to the issue
of whether it was permissible, when a petition was subject to dual interpretation,
to read it as a civil rights petition rather than as one for habeas relief, yet this is
precisely the proposition for which the Wilwording Court cited Jackson. 404 U.S.
at 251. It should also be noted that there is little precedent within the Eighth Circuit
for granting a hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus where relief other
than total release is sought. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir.
1971); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), rehearing denied, 194 F.2d 917
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952). Thus, in the Eighth Circuit, unless
there are "exceptional circumstances," habeas corpus is not the proper procedure
to challenge the condition or manner of confinement. See Cates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d
926, 927 (8th Cir. 1970).
40. 392 U.S. 639 (1968). Prisoner brought a civil rights action seeking the
return of certain legal materials which the prison authorities had confiscated because
the materials had been found in the possession of another prisoner which constituted
a breach of the prison rules. The Court found that, in light of the interpretation
given to the rules by the prison authorities, exhaustion would be futile. However,
the Court went on to hold that, in any event, resort to such remedies is unnecessary
in a suit brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 640.
41. See notes 24-26 and acompanying text supra.
42. 404 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).
43. See Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963), in which the court
held that, although the traditional function of habeas corpus is to test the legality
of the confinement, the court has a discretionary right to treat the complaint as one
for injunctive relief. Id. at 550.
44. __ F.2d at _. Judge Friendly stated:
[T~he proper course for the en banc court was to affirm the orders of the
district court without writing opinions, and to leave it to the State of New York
to assert possible distinctions by petitions for certiorari.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss5/5

26

Editors: Recent Developments

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

The initial concern of the Wilwording Court was that it had not been
referred to a single instance in which the Missouri courts had granted
a hearing to a prisoner on the conditions of his confinement. 45 This was
46
not the case in New York, as the dissent in Rodriguez indicated.
Although, in Wright v. McMann,47 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had held that New York law was inadequate to grant proper relief
to a prisoner challenging the conditions of his confinement, the state legislature remedied the situation by enacting section 79-c of the New York
Civil Rights Law which stated:
A convict sentenced to imprisonment is under the protection of
the law, and any injury to his person, not authorized by law, is
punishable in the same manner as if he were not sentenced and
convicted.
Nothing in sections seventy-nine or seventy-nine-a of this chapter
shall be deemed to deny a convict sentenced to imprisonment to the
right to injunctive relief for improper treatment where
such treatment
4
constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights. 8
However, as pointed out above, 49 the Wilwording Court's holding
that the petitioners were entitled to have their pleadings read as made
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act apparently did not depend on the Court's
initial finding that the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement had
been met. Therefore, although a distinction can be made between the
situation in Wilwording and that in Rodriguez (in the former, resort to
the state courts would have been futile, while in the latter it would not),
it is suggested that the Supreme Court would not deem this distinction to
be sufficiently decisive.
Secondly, a distinction can be made as to the scope of habeas corpus
relief. The Missouri courts adhere to the limited definition of the scope
of habeas relief.50 New York, on the other hand, apparently adheres to
the liberal interpretation of habeas corpus, for, in People ex rel. Brown v.
Johnson,5 relief was granted to a habeas petitioner who did not challenge
the validity of his sentence or confinement and did not seek total release.
Arguably, Wilwording should only apply in jurisdictions like Missouri
where habeas relief is not available to a prisoner challenging the conditions
45. 404 U.S. at 250.
46-...... F.2d at ..-(Lumbard, J., dissenting).
47. 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
48. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-c (McKinney Supp. 1971).
49. See note 35 supra.
50. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 439 F.2d 1331, 1333 (8th Cir. 1971).
51. 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961). Petitioner sought
a writ of habeas corpus to test the validity of his transfer from a penal institution to
a state hospital for the insane. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
appellate division had erred in dismissing the application. Id. at 486, 174 N.E.2d at
726, 215 N.Y.S. at 46.
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or manners of his confinement, for only in these jurisdictions would it be
futile to require the prisoner to exhaust his state habeas remedy. Again,
however, it must be pointed out that the availability of any adequate state
remedy, or the lack of such a remedy, does not appear to be a decisive
factor in the Court's reasoning in Wilwording.
When the realities of post-conviction proceedings are considered, the
rationale of Wilwording, as interpreted by the Rodriguez court, is quite
sound. In most circumstances, the federal court appoints counsel in postconviction proceedings only after the prisoner's pro se petition has passed
an initial judicial evaluation and the court has determined that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. 52 Since the habeas corpus petition is relatively simple to prepare13 and, in most cases, may be the only petition
54
which the petitioner has the ability and sophistication to formulate, it
seems only proper that a prisoner who has a legitimate constitutional grievance should be permitted to present his grievance to the federal courts in
the form most readily available to him. Any other result would be merely
exalting form over substance.
The dissent in Rodriguez felt that, under the majority's interpretation
of Wilwording, the already heavily burdened federal courts will be compelled to spend time sifting through prisoners' pro se petitions to determine
which of them present claims cognizable under the civil rights statutes. In
addition, a very high percentage of the petitions which do assert a civil
rights cause of action will require an evidentiary hearing for their disposition,5 5 whereas most habeas corpus petitions can be disposed of on the
face of the petition or after submission of a paper record.56
Presently, there seems to be no solution to these problems to ease
the resulting burden on judicial resources. It is submitted, however, that
this burden is not as cumbersome as it initially appears to be. Unless
the exhaustion requirement of section 2254(b) is repealed, it is certain
that exhaustion will continue to be required in cases involving prisoner
57
challenges to the validity of state court convictions and confinement.
Wilwording and Rodriguez will permit circumvention of the exhaustion
requirement only in cases where the manner and/or conditions of confinement are challenged. Yet, regardless of how heavy this burden might be,
52. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969).
53. Id. at 500, where Justice White in dissent stated:
Habeas corpus petitions . . . are relatively easy to prepare: they need only
set out the facts giving rise to a claim for relief and the judge will apply
the law, appointing a lawyer for the prisoner and giving him a hearing when
appropriate.
See also Krause, A Lawyer Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. RIv. 371, 371-72
(1968).
54. See Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 349
(1968).
55. __ F.2d at .-- (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at .--- (Kaufman, J., concurring).
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the fact remains that a civil rights plaintiff is entitled to choose a federal
forum. 58 It would be ludicrous to suggest that his right to select such a
forum is contingent upon his sophistication and ability as a writ-writer.
As Judge Smith stated in his separate concurring opinion in Rodriguez:
I question the desirability of even attempting to lighten our burden
by stifling or delaying prisoners' complaints of unconstitutional abuse.
... It would be far better to provide more assistance in the districts
which contain Attica and the other large institutions giving rise to
these issues than to deny redress within the federal court system for
deprivation of civil rights. 59
Several of the concurring opinions in Rodriguez called for legislative
action to alleviate the burden on the courts,60 but no suggestion was
made as to what form this relief should take. Once it is recognized that
the problem exists, it is difficult to conceive of any type of effective legislative relief other than a statute (similar to 28 U.S.C. § 2254) which would
require exhaustion of state remedies in prisoners' civil rights actions or
require a showing either that no state remedy exists or that it would be
futile to pursue it. Since state courts are competent to adjudicate federal
questions, both constitutional and statutory, 61 the suggested statute would
not be unfeasible. However, limiting its effect to prisoners' civil rights suits,
even if the possibility of an ensuing equal protection argument could be
overlooked, 62 would seem to be a baseless limitation. Federal jurisdiction
in the area of state prisoners' rights is hardly more offensive to the states
58. See generally Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) ; McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
59. F.2d at _. Judges Smith and Kaufman, in their concurring opinions,
did not construe Wilwording as a ground breaking decision. See note 37 supra. In
this respect, their opinions differ from that of Chief Judge Friendly. However,
Judge Friendly stated:
[A]I1 state prisoner petitions complaining of the length or manner of custody,
however phrased, are in fact petitions for habeas corpus. . . . If they are, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) forbids a federal court from proceeding in the first instance
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the state ....
-_
F.2d at_
On the other hand, Judge Kaufman (and apparently Judge Smith, since
he concurred in Judge Kaufman's opinion) felt that the "habeas corpus exhaustion
requirement . . . is concerned with prisoner challenges to the validity of state
court convictions or sentences." Id. at -_ (emphasis added). Wilwording suggests
that the approach taken by Judges Smith and Kaufman is correct.
It is worthy of note that the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the
validity of the more liberal definition of the scope of habeas corpus by finding that the
Wilwording petitions, challenging the conditions and manner of confinement, were
cognizable in federal habeas corpus. 404 U.S. at 251.
60. The opinions of Judges Feinberg and Oakes called for congressional action.
F.2d at _
61. 1A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.201, at 2017 (2d ed. 1953).

62. The possibility of avoiding the equal protection issue if such a statute were
enacted would be difficult in light of the Wilwording holding that "[s]tate prisoners
are not held to any stricter standard of exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs."
404 U.S. at 251.
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than the existence of federal jurisdiction in the area of police procedures, 3
education, 64 welfare, 65 or public housing.6 6 Thus it would seem that a
rational statute would require exhaustion in all types of civil rights suits,
with the necessary concommitant that a venerable line of Supreme Court
cases, beginning with Monroe v. Pape,6 7 would have to be overruled.
The Rodriguez interpretation of Wilwording is a judicial recognition
of a state prisoner's plight. In light of the recent and growing recognition
of a broader scope of habeas corpus,68 and in light of the fact that the
habeas corpus petition is relatively simple to prepare, 69 courts must be
aware that many petitions denominated "habeas corpus" actually assert
civil rights causes of action. As to these petitions, in the absence of a
legislative mandate to the contrary, it is only proper that exhaustion not
be required. State prisoners should not be held to a stricter standard of
exhaustion than other civil rights plaintiffs. 70 The particular form of a
petitioner's pleadings should not affect his civil rights.
Thomas I. Feeney, III
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
Holmes v. Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
365 U.S. 167 (1961). See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.

70. 404 U.S. at 251.
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